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Abstract: An expanding body of literature has addressed the question of the 
economic impact terrorist attacks have. A part of this literature has focused on 
the impact recent major terrorist hits had on financial markets. The question 
addressed by this paper is to what extent markets’ reaction to major terrorist 
hits has changed over time. A large - the London stock exchange - and a small 
- the Athens stock exchange - capitalization market are used as the vehicles 
for the empirical investigation. Results from event study methodology as well 
as from conditional volatility models used here do no seem to point to any 
clear and unequivocal picture. Both markets appear to react selectively to 
terrorist events with no evidence of a noticeable change through time.   
Generally the effects appear to be transitory in both markets and seem to 
depend on the political and symbolic significance of the target hit. Market size 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the predominance over the past decade or so of terrorism as the 
main international security threat, the number of papers that take up the issue 
of the economic effects of terrorist actions, and more broadly of the costs of 
thwarting terrorism, has steadily grown. In particular, recent terrorist mega-
attacks such as 9/11; the March 2004 Madrid and July 2005 London bombings 
by transnational terrorist organisations and their local operatives, have 
spurred research on the direct and indirect economic consequences of terrorist 
hits. From early pioneering works such as Enders et al. (1992), Enders and 
Sandler (1991, 1996) to more recent studies such as Drakos and Kutan (2003), 
Blomberg et al (2004), Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), Enders et al. (2006), Llorca-
Vivero (2008), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008), Larocque et al. (2010); the 
economic repercussions of terrorist actions have been studied for a number of 
countries and different economic sectors and activities such as for example 
tourism, FDI flows, macroeconomic performance. 
A part this growing literature has focused its attention to the possible 
effects terrorist incidents can have on stock markets. As, among others, Carter 
and Simkins (2004), Chen and Siems (2004) note, from the markets’ 
perspective, terrorist hits are important and momentous unforeseen events 
that can and do severely disrupt the normal, daily routine of economic life 
due to the havoc they generate since they destroy capital and infrastructure 
and cause widespread damages as well as losses of life. Among others, 
Asteriou and Siriopoulos (2003) point out that markets often reverberate and   3
echo major events that act as exogenous shocks the impact of which is not 
limited to the sphere of politics but has direct economic effects. Indeed, the 
agenda of terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda is to disrupt and destroy 
the daily economic and social routine of the targeted metropolitan centres that 
offer a target rich environment. Financial markets react both in terms of 
returns as well as volatility to external mega events such as a major terrorist 
attack.  Empirical studies such as for example Nikkinen et al, (2008), Barros 
and Gil-Alana (2008), Eldor and Melnick (2004), Drakos (2004), Hon et al 
(2004), have set out to investigate the impact major terrorist incidents have on 
capital markets. For instance, Nikkinen et al, (2008) examine the effects of 9/11 
on 53 markets world wide with results indicating increased volatility as well 
as short-run negative effects that varied across regions depending on the 
degree of their integration in the global economy. From a different angle, Hon 
et al. (2004) focus on how the cross-country correlation of assets was affected 
from this terrorist mega event.  The 9/11 effects on the shares of the airline 
industry is the issue addressed by the studies of Drakos (2004) and Carter and 
Simkins (2004). Two other major terrorist hits, the March 2004 Madrid and 
July 2005 London bombings, and the reaction of the Spanish and London 
markets, is the theme of Kollias et al. (2010). Other studies, instead of focusing 
on the consequences of a single major terrorist incident have looked at how 
ongoing terrorist activity has affected financial markets. For instance, in the 
case of Israel, a country that over the years has fallen victim to numerous and 
frequent terrorist attacks that have caused thousands of casualties, a high   4
death toll and extensive damages, Eldor and Melnick (2004) investigate the 
impact that such hits had on Israel’s foreign exchange and stock markets with 
findings indicating a permanent effect on both markets. The effects on global 
capital markets of major terrorist/military incidents dating back to 1915 is the 
theme of Chen and Siems (2004) using an event study methodology. They 
report a growing resilience of markets to major, unanticipated incidents. 
Evidence reported by Arin et al. (2008) in the case of six different financial 
markets shows that terrorist attacks have a significant impact on market 
volatility and returns with more pronounced effects in emerging markets. 
Adverse effects are also reported by Barros and Gil-Alana (2008) that 
investigate the effects that ETA terrorist actions had on the Basque country 
stock market. 
Broadly in line with the latter studies, the question investigated here is 
not the effects on financial markets of a single terrorist mega attack but rather 
whether or not stock exchanges’ reaction to terrorist activity has changed over 
time. To this effect, a number of different terrorist hits over the last twenty-
five years are examined in the case of a large and a small capitalisation 
European market. The London and Athens stock markets are used as the 
vehicles for the purposes of this empirical investigation. A total of nineteen 
terrorist attacks, selected in terms of importance and magnitude, perpetrated 
both by domestic as well as transnational terrorist organisations, are used in 
order to address the issue at hand.   
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2. THE MARKETS AND THE TERRORIST INCIDENTS 
Neither the UK nor Greece are strangers to terrorism. Over the years 
both countries have been the venue of terrorist activity both by domestic 
terrorist groups but also by transnational terrorist organisations such as Al-
Qaeda in the case of the UK.  Of the two countries it is the UK that has a much 
longer and bloodier history of terrorist activity both domestic as well as 
transnational. Over the years the UK has been the venue of some of the 
biggest terrorist hits worldwide both in terms of victims but also in terms of 
the symbolic significance of the targets that were chosen by the perpetrators. 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), a paramilitary organisation 
aiming at removing Northern Ireland from the UK and bring about a united 
Ireland was the terrorist group that conducted a bloody campaign for around 
three decades both in the Northern Ireland and in England. It is estimated 
that IRA’s terrorist attacks have caused the deaths of almost two thousand 
people both civilians and members various security forces. Perhaps the most 
significant attack in terms of symbolism was the Brighton Hotel bombing in 
October 1984 when the IRA attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher (Table 1). She narrowly escaped death but five people did loose their 
lives. Other IRA attacks have claimed the lives of military personnel, such as 
the September 1989 with eleven marines killed; politicians as in the case of the 
July 1990 assassination of a conservative MP; or civilians in a number of other 
cases as it can be seen in Table 1. Apart from domestic terrorism the UK has 
also been the venue of attacks by international terrorists with the most   6
prominent and heinous, that left scores of people dead, the 1988 and 2005 
bombings. The first was a suitcase bomb aboard Pan Am Flight 103 over 
Scotland (town of Lockerbie) by Libyan state backed terrorists that caused the 
death of the 270 passengers and crew of the airplane. The more recent one, the 
July 7, 2005 conducted by Islamist extremists with Al Qaeda affiliations, 
targeted London’s transportation system during the morning rush hour and 
left 56 dead and more than 700 injured (Table 1).           
  
Table 1: Targets, casualties and perpetrators of the terrorist incidents 






Brighton Hotel bombing 
– attempted assassination 




Libyan backed terrorists 
Bomb onboard Pan-Am 
flight 103- Lockerbie 
Scotland   270  0 
22/09/1989  IRA  Army barracks bombed  11  22 




Bombing in St. Mary Axe 




Bombing in Bishopsgate, 
City of London  0  40 




Central Criminal Court & 
Army recruitment office  1  238 
07/07/2005 Al-Qaeda  cells 
London transportation 
system bombings  56  700 
GREECE 




Arab Revolutionary Cells 
Bomb onboard TWA 
flight 840 en route from 




Car bomb kills US 
Defence Attaché  1  0 




Bomb kills American 




Assassination of Turkish 




Assassination of Turkish 
diplomat 1  0 









British Defence Attaché 
assassinated 1  0   7
 
In comparison, the terrorist hits in Greece have not been as bloody in 
terms of victims. The choice of targets, however, has often been quite 
significant since it involved the assassination of diplomatic emissaries such as 
for example the US and British Defence Attachés in June 28, 1988 and June 8, 
2000 respectively; US military personnel in March 1991; personnel of the 
Turkish Embassy in October 1991 and July 1994; or politicians as in the case of 
the September 1989 assassination of a member of Parliament; prominent 
businesspeople as in the case of the May 1997 assassination. With the 
exception of a hit by international terrorists with a bomb aboard a TWA flight 
that killed four US citizens in April 1986; all other terrorist incidents had 
domestic perpetrators (Table 1). November 17th (N17) and the Revolutionary 
People’s Struggle (ELA) are the two main domestic terrorist groups that 
operated in Greece in the last three decades or so with the former being the 
most active and responsible for the death of twenty three people. The latter 
was considered to be an ideological and operational off-spring of N17 and has 
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Table 2: Main stock market indicators: Average annual values  
for the period 1990-2009 
 
   ASE LSE 
Total Value of Share Trading 
52.585,45 3.480.173,25  (Domestic & Foreign, including 
Investment Funds, in USD millions)  
Total Number of Listed Companies  
247 2667  (Domestic & Foreign, Main & Parallel 
Markets) 
Domestic Market Capitalization  
86.004,59 2.130.057,03  (Main & Parallel Markets, in USD 
millions)  
 
In the section that follows, the effects of the terrorist attacks presented 
in Table 1 will be investigated in the case of the London and Athens stock 
exchanges (henceforth LSE and ASE). The former is a large capitalisation 
mature market, one of the three most important stock exchanges 
internationally, with a current capitalisation over $3,500 billion and 
approximately 1,800 listed companies. By comparison, as it can be seen in 
Table 2, the ASE is a midget both in terms of capitalisation as well as the 
number of listed companies. It has around 4% of the capitalization of the LSE 
and presents a much lower trading activity, for the period 1990-2009. Thus, 
the sheer difference in size adds a further interesting twist since, apart from 
examining possible changes in how markets reacted overtime to the 
exogenous shocks of terrorist hits; we will also look at whether size and 
maturity are also factors that affect markets’ reaction. The evolution of the 
main indices that describe and encapsulate the two markets’ differences is 
graphically presented in Figure 1.     9
 
 Figure 1: Trading volume, Capitalization and number of listed companies in 
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3. METHODOLOGY, EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
A two step methodology is used to address the issue at hand. First, in 
line with other studies such as for instance Chen and Siems (2004), we employ 
event study analysis to investigate the effect of the terrorist events on the two 
stock markets. Following this, conditional volatility models are estimated in 
order to see their effect on stock market volatility. 
The event study methodology is based on the effective markets 
hypothesis (Fama et al., 1969). Essentially, it assumes that as new information 
becomes available as a result of an important unpredictable event, market 
agents will take it into consideration and will re-evaluate the individual firms 
and their ability to operate efficiently given the economic, environmental, 
political, social and demographic changes that an exogenous event may bring 
about. The power of this methodology is based on its ability to trace such 
“abnormal” changes, because it follows the general valuation of many 
investors that (re)examine quickly all the available data for the estimation of 
the market value of each traded stock (Schwert, 1981). The daily excess   10
returns (abnormal returns) are measured by the mean-adjusted-returns 
approach (MacKinlay, 1997); that is for each day at, and following, the event, 
we computed: 
R R AR t t                                 (1) 
Where t AR is the abnormal return for the stock index at time t,  t R  is the actual 
observed rate of return for this index, and R is the mean of this index daily 








t R R           ( 2 )  
Initially, the event-day abnormal returns are calculated. Given that the 
event date is at t=0, and following Chen and Siems (2004), the mean adjusted 
returns model is estimated over 20 days, from t=-30 to t=-11. Moreover, we 
examine two longer event windows to see how quickly the market absorbs 
the consequences from the events considered here. The two longer event 
windows are examined by estimating the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CARs) 5 days (t=5) and 10 days following the event (t=10). The 








t t AR CAR         ( 3 )  
Where T1 is the event day and T2 is consequently 5 and 10 days after the 
event. The statistical importance of the abnormal returns for the period 
examined here was estimated for each sample, using the statistics described 
by Brown and Warner (1985).    11












London Stock Exchange 
12/10/1984  0,02% -3,61%  -2,71%  Attempted 
assassination of 
Prime Minister   (0.03) (-4.60)*  (-3.45)* 
21/12/1988 
-0,07% 1,72% 5,68%  Pan Am flight 
103- Lockerbie 
Scotland  (-0.10) (2.64)*  (8.68)* 
22/9/1989 
-0,57% -4,74%  -7,18%  Army barracks 
bombed 
(-0.62) (-5.15)*  (-7.81)* 
30/7/1990 
-0,56% -3,98%  -3,96%  Assassination of  
MP 
(-0.58) (-4.09)*  (-4.07)* 
10/4/1992 
5,62% 8,05%  11,10%  Bombing in St. 
Mary Axe in 
London  (5.10)* (7.30)*  (10.08)* 
24/4/1993 
-0,53% -0,05% 3,39%  Bombing in 
Bishopsgate, City 
of London  (-0.88) (-0.08)  (5.65)* 
30/4/1999 
0,63% -3,31%  -7,09%  Nail bomb in pub 
(0.55) (-2.91)*  (-6.22)* 
8/3/2001 
0,26% -5,92%  -7,66%  Criminal Court & 
Army recruitment 
offices  (0.17) (-3.81)*  (-4.93)* 
7/7/2005 
-1,49% -0,84 -1,27  London 
transportation 
system bombings  (-2.89)* (-1.64)  (-2.47)* 
Athens Stock Exchange 
26/11/1985 
0,57% 0,54%  -0,58%  Police bus 
bombing 
(1.33) (1.26)  (-1.37) 
2/4/1986 
0,47% 0,07%  0,84%  TWA flight 840 
en route from 
Rome to Athens  (1.37) (0.20)  (2.46)* 
28/6/1988 
-0,89% -2,38%  -2,21%  Car bomb kills US 
Defence Attaché 
(-0.91) (-2.42)*  (-2.25)* 
26/9/1989 
-1,59% 6,45% 1,37%  Assassination of  
prominent MP 
(-0.51) (2.07)* (0.44) 
12/3/1991 
-3,85% -14,52%  -18,14%  Bomb kills 
American 
serviceman  (-1.70) (-6.41)*  (-8.01)* 
7/10/1991 
2,00% 1,06%  1,98%  Assassination of 
Turkish Embassy 
employee  (1.70) (0.90)  (1.67) 
4/7/1994 
-0,14% 1,89% 3,01%  Assassination of 
Turkish diplomat 
(-0.14) (1.88)  (2.99)* 
19/9/1994 
1,44% 1,15%  4,77%  Bombing of 
police bus 
(2.03)* (1.63)  (6.74)* 
28/5/1997 
-0,45% -7,98%  -11,51%  Prominent 
businessperson 
assassinated  (-0.25) (-4.55)*  (-6.57)* 
8/6/2000 
0,67% -1,01%  -9,87%  British Defence 
Attaché 
assassinated  (0.50) (-0.75)  (-7.34)* 
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Broadly speaking, from the event study findings presented in Table 3, 
it appears that no unequivocal picture and clear pattern emerge as to the 
markets’ reaction to the events. In the case of the LSE in five out of the nine 
events - 12/10/1984, 22/09/1989, 30/07/1990, 30/04/1999, 08/03/2001 – the 
reaction is found to be negative and significant but not on the same day of the 
occurrence of the event. The 6-day CARs for these five incidents are negative 
and significant and only in the case of the recent terrorist bombings in July 
2005 does the market record a same day significant negative reaction. Strikes 
at targets with strong political symbolism, as in the case of the 1984 Brighton 
Hotel bombing that threatened the life of the British Prime Minister and the 
1990 assassination of a Conservative MP cause, as one would intuitively 
expect, a strong negative reaction. It is also quite possible that such attacks on 
targets that can hardly be considered as soft are regarded as indications of 
increased operational capability by the terrorists and thus they further 
augment markets’ reaction. The number of fatalities may explain the reaction 
in the case of the 1989 event as well as the type of the target – military 
barracks – that again be seen as revealing increased and effective operational 
capabilities. An explanation along the same lines may also be advanced in the 
case of the 2001 incident. But this leaves the findings for the 1992 and 1993 
attacks a bit difficult to explain given the similarities in terms of symbolism of 
the targets. The negative and significant CARs for the 1999 attack, which is 
not an IRA operation, are also difficult to explain given that it neither had a 
strong symbolism in terms of the target nor did it cause many fatalities.     13
Counterintuitive are also the findings in the case of the Pan-Am flight 103 that 
was brought down near the Scottish town of Lockerbie by a suitcase bomb 
aboard the aircraft killing 270 people including eleven people on the ground. 
It was by far the bloodiest in terms of victims attack in the UK. A tentative 
explanation is that this hit took place just before Christmas and thus the 
vacation lull did not offer ample time for market agents to react. By the time 
markets fully reopened the immediate fallout of the incident probably had 
already been absorbed.   
Turning to the findings for the ASE a broadly similar hazy picture 
seems to emerge on the basis of the event study results (Table 1). On three 
occasions – the terrorist hits of 28/6/1988, 12/3/1991 and 28/5/1997 – does 
the market present a significant negative reaction in terms of the 6-day CARs. 
The fact that the victim of the 1997 assassination attack was a prominent 
businessperson probably adequately explains the strong negative 6- and 11-
day CARs.  The other two events involved the death of an American citizen: 
the US Defence Attaché in 1988 and a serviceman in 1991. The fact that US 
citizens were the victims of the attacks probably offers an adequate 
explanation for the market’s reaction as this is recorded by both the 6- and 11-
day CARs. Oddly enough, this is not the case of the 2000 assassination by N17 
of the British Defence Attaché in Athens although, in this case, the 11-day 
CARs are also found negative and significant. One may tentatively interpret 
this finding as a reaction by the market to the stern international political 
pressure that gradually built demanding more effective antiterrorist measures   14
and policy by the Greek authorities given the fact that N17 had operated for 
all the previous years with complete impunity. Worth noting is also the fact 
that no significant reaction is found for two other incidents where foreign 
diplomats were the victims. In October 1991, a few months after the US 
serviceman was killed, a Turkish embassy employee is assassinated and in 
July 1994 a Turkish diplomat is the victim of N17’s operation. On both 
occasions, no significant negative reaction is found. Similar is the finding in 
the case of the assassination of the prominent MP in 1989 with no negative 
reaction recorded in the ASE although the attack strongly stirred the political 
scene at the time. No strong reaction is also the case when the police are the 
target of the attacks as in the case of the November 1985 and September 1994 
bombings that each killed a policeman. On the whole, it would appear that, in 
the case of the ASE, a strong negative reaction is recorded whenever the 
targets of the terrorist attacks are foreign nationals and in particular US 
citizens given the importance of the Greek-US bilateral relations. Perhaps, a 
noteworthy difference with the LSE is that the reaction of the ASE, when 
present, is much more pronounced and strong as this is reflected in the 6- and 
11-day CARs. The political and economic significance of the targets that 
trigger a reaction as well as the maturity and size of the market in terms of 
trading and capitalisation vis-à-vis LSE probably explain this difference in our 
findings. This is broadly line with the results reported by Arin et al. (2008) 
where they conclude that the impact of terrorist incidents seems to be larger 
in emerging markets.     15
We now proceed with the second stage of our investigation since the 
event study methodology employed thus far does not offer any insights on 
the volatility of the markets on the days of the events. Thus conditional 
volatility models were used. To start with, the unconditional stock return 
volatility, the terror index and the two general indices are shown in Figure 2. 
The terror index is constructed following the methodology of Eckstein and 
Tsiddon (2004) whereby the daily index is defined as the natural logarithm of 
(e + number of fatalities +number of injuries) that occurred each day. The 
terror events that took place during the weekend are summed up to the 
previous Friday’s figure. This will be introduced in the conditional volatility 
analysis that follows.  
Figure 2:  Unconditional volatilities, terrorist events and stock prices 
in LSE and ASE 
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Observing high frequency financial series we often see that their 
volatility is time varying and that volatility clustering is also a frequent 
phenomenon. This roughly suggests that big changes tend to be followed by 
big changes and small changes are followed by small ones. Therefore there 
exists a time dependence on the variance of the series. Over the last two 
decades, ARCH and GARCH models, developed by Engle (1982) and 
Bollerslev (1986) respectively, became the dominant tools in modelling time 
varying volatilities in stock markets. Given the difficulty in optimal lag length 
selection in ARCH models, and ensuring the non-negativity of the coefficients 
on the conditional variance equation, Bollerslev’s (1986) GARCH model is 
more frequently used in empirical finance. Thus, in our study in order to 
investigate the effect of the terror events on the stock markets’ volatility a 
model of the following form for the mean and the variance is estimated: 
t t t t D b R b b R      
19101987










1 1 0         ( 5 )  
Where  t R , is the daily return for the stock index and 1  t R its one period lag 
value, and 
19101987
t D  a dummy for the “black Monday” of October 1987, and  t   
is the error term with conditional mean zero and conditional variance  t h . 
In line with previous studies, (inter allia: Athanassiou et al., 2006; 
Shawkat and Huimin, 2008; Kollias et al., 2010) equation (5), is a GARCH(1,1)   17
model, augmented with the dummies for the exogenous shocks. The variable 
t i D ,  takes the values of 1 on the event day i, in order to quantify any possible 
effect of the terrorist event on conditional volatility. However, by just 
including such dummies, all the events are treated equally. Thus, in order to 
allow for the significance of the incident as this is reflected in the number of 
victims and following Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), the terror index referred 
to earlier was included in the variance equation: 
  t t t t Ter h β + ε α + α = h 1 1 1
2
1 1 0                       (6) 
Where, 0 0 > α ,  0 1 > α ,  0 1 > β  are the required conditions for the variance to be 
positive while the stability condition is  1 1 1  β + α . This sum is also called 
persistence, and the long-term prediction of the variance is  0 α . 
However, the GARCH model imposes symmetry on the conditional 
variance that might not be appropriate for the prediction of return volatility. 
Therefore, Nelson (1991) introduced the exponential GARCH model and 
proposed a way to examine the asymmetry, allowing negative and positive 
shocks to have different results. The logarithmic construction of variance 
equation ensures that the evaluated conditional variance is strictly positive 
and therefore the non-negativity constrains used in the estimation of the 
GARCH models, are not necessary. Under the standard EGARCH(1,1) the 
conditional variance is given by: 








































+ = h  

               (7) 
Where  1 1 1 0 , , ,     are constant parameters. Since the parameter  1   
typically enters equation (7) with a negative sign, bad news  1  t   generates 
more volatility than good news. In our study, equation (7) is augmented by 
including the dummy variables in one case, and the terror index in the other 
case, as we did before with the symmetric GARCH(1,1), in order to take into 
account the terror exogenous shocks. The estimated results for the alternative 
conditional volatility models, including the GARCH and EGARCH versions 
with and without exogenous shocks, are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The left-
hand panel of theses tables displays the results of estimating the standard 
GARCH(1,1) model without taking into account the exogenous shocks, while 
the next columns refers to the GARCH model augmented with the terror 
index and the dummies respectively. The same is followed for the EGARCH 
model for each of the two markets. 
Looking at Table 4 where the LSE findings are presented it appears 
that the impact of the constructed terror index is statistically significant in the 
symmetric GARCH model. The estimation broadly yields similar results 
when the dummy variables are introduced instead of the terror index. 
However, as it can be observed, not all the dummies are significant. In 
particular, the GARCH results indicate that the April 1992 and April 19993 
bombings in St. Mary Axe and Bishopsgate respectively do not seem to have 
impacted the market’s volatility. No effect on returns was also the finding for   19
these two incidents in the event study results reported in Table 3 earlier. No 
effect on volatility is also the finding for the 2005 attacks on the London 
transportation system as the GARCH results show. These findings suggest 
that not all the events have an equal impact on the stock market’s volatility. A 
further interesting finding is that, when the EGARCH model is estimated, the 
factor responsible for asymmetric behaviour is found statistically significant, 
but the terrorist incidents variables are not. This means that the exogenous 
security shocks variable in this model captures the asymmetric effects on 
stock market volatility caused by the terrorist incidents. 
 





b0 0.0005 (0.00) -0.0003 (0.10) 0.0004 (0.00) 0.0003 (0.00) 0.0003 (0.00) 0.0003 (0.00)
b1 0.0144 (0.38) -0.0163 (0.65) -0.0182 (0.50) 0.0178 (0.24) 0.0178 (0.24) 0.0164 (0.28)
b2 -0.0884 (0.00) -0.1216 (0.00) -0.1184 (0.00) -0.0872 (0.00) -0.0872 (0.00) -0.0873 (0.00)
The conditional 
variance model
α0 1.43E-06 (0.00) 0.0001 (0.00) 7.61E-05 (0.00) -0.2443 (0.00) -0.3739 (0.00) -0.2461 (0.00)
α1 0.0875 (0.00) 0.1465 (0.00) 0.1300 (0.00) 0.1427 (0.00) 0.1416 (0.00) 0.1415 (0.00)
β1 0.8999 (0.00) 0.5779 (0.00) 0.5047 (0.00) 0.9858 (0.00) 0.9862 (0.00) 0.9858 (0.00)
γ -0.0574 (0.00) -0.0572 (0.00) -0.0550 (0.00)
λ1 -2.40E-05 (0.00) 0.1337 (0.16)
δ1   - 12/10/1984 -1.36E-04 (0.00) 0.9061 (0.18)
δ2   - 21/12/1988 -1.54E-04 (0.00) 0.3367 (0.40)
δ3   - 22/09/1989 -1.35E-04 (0.00) 0.6096 (0.26)
δ4   - 30/07/1990 -1.54E-04 (0.00) 0.5074 (0.43)
δ5   - 10/04/1992 4.39E-05 (0.98) 1.0644 (0.35)
δ6   - 24/04/1993 -1.16E-04 (0.37) 0.1734 (0.81)
δ7   - 30/04/1999 -1.93E-04 (0.00) 0.0507 (0.93)
δ8   - 03/08/2001 -1.29E-04 (0.00) 1.2096 (0.00)
δ9   - 07/07/2005 -6.52E-05 (0.46) 0.1901 (0.83)
Akaike info criterion -6.544486 -6.28442 -6.216468 -6.550248 -6.55136 -6.550991
Schwarz criterion -6.538408 -6.27733 -6.201272 -6.543157 -6.54325 -6.534782
EGARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1)
Exogenous Shocks Exogenous Shocks
With Terror Index With Dummies Without Without With Terror Index With Dummies
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the probability values of the t-statistics 
 
Turning to the results in the case of the ASE in Table 5, it can be seen 
that the terrorist variables significantly affect stock market volatility. Again, 
as one would expect, not all incidents have the same effect on the conditional   20
volatility of the market. The assassination of the US and British Defence 
Attachés in June 1986 and June 2000 seem to have a strong impact on 
volatility both in the GARCH and EGARCH results offering further evidence 
in support of the argument that the political importance of the targets hit is a 
factor that has strongly impacted ASE’s reaction to such exogenous shocks. 
The TWA event in April 1986 also seems to have had a noteworthy effect on 
ASE’s volatility as the results of both the GARCH and EGARCH models 
indicate. Finally, an interesting observation from the reported results in Table 
5 is that, in the case of ASE, bad news do not seem to have a greater impact on 
stock market volatility compared to the good news.  
   





b0 0.0005 (0.00) 0.0004 (0.11) 0.0009 (0.00) 0.0005 (0.00) 0.0005 (0.00) 0.0006 (0.00)
b1 0.1937 (0.00) 0.1867 (0.00) 0.1820 (0.00) 0.1986 (0.00) 0.2005 (0.00) 0.2342 (0.00)
b2 0.0626 (0.32) -0.0279 (0.83) -0.0081 (0.30) -0.0771 (0.25) 0.0663 (0.37) -0.0608 (0.23)
The conditional 
variance model
α0 3.78E-06 (0.00) 0.0002 (0.00) 2.46E-04 (0.00) -0.4409 (0.00) 0.1964 (0.51) -4.9222 (0.00)
α1 0.1614 (0.00) 0.2046 (0.00) 0.1358 (0.00) 0.2862 (0.00) 0.2850 (0.00) 0.6041 (0.00)
β1 0.8405 (0.00) 0.5856 (0.00) 0.5494 (0.00) 0.9729 (0.00) 0.9722 (0.00) 0.4618 (0.00)
γ -0.0045 (0.77) -0.0068 (0.67) -0.0191 (0.51)
λ1 -8.98E-05 (0.00) -0.6419 (0.03)
δ1   - 26/11/1985 -0.000549 (0.90) -3.1802 (0.00)
δ2   - 02/04/1986 -0.000548 (0.00) -4.7124 (0.00)
δ3   - 28/06/1988 -0.000529 (0.00) -1.4572 (0.00)
δ4   - 26/09/1989 0.000292 (0.70) 0.3735 (0.67)
δ5   - 12/03/1991 -0.000613 (0.12) -0.2161 (0.40)
δ6   - 07/10/1991 -0.000398 (0.00) -0.1643 (0.57)
δ7   - 04/07/1994 -0.000522 (0.00) -0.1753 (0.47)
δ8   - 19/09/1994 -0.000552 (0.00) -4.9946 (0.00)
δ9   - 28/05/1997 -0.00058 (0.00) -0.7838 (0.50)
δ10   - 08/06/2000 -0.000528 (0.00) -1.1229 (0.00)
Akaike info criterion -5.762291 -5.60628 -5.144777 -5.752749 -5.75378 -6.550991
Schwarz criterion -5.756004 -5.59894 -5.128009 -5.745413 -5.7454 -6.534782
GARCH(1,1) EGARCH(1,1)
Without Without With Terror Index With Dummies With Terror Index With Dummies
Exogenous Shocks Exogenous Shocks
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the probability values of the t-statistics 
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Comparing the results for UK and Greece, it appears that the latter 
presents evidence of a lower degree of market efficiency due to the 
significance of past returns in the mean equation as well as the fact that the 
information concerning volatility observed in the previous period (the ARCH 
term,  α) has a higher effect on volatility. Nevertheless, when it comes to 
volatility persistence the two stock exchanges present a fairly similar 
behaviour. As demonstrated by Aggarwal et al. (1999) and Malik (2003) 
persistence of volatility decreases dramatically when regime shifts are 
included in a GARCH model.  Our results, indicates that the inclusion of the 
terror index or dummies for capturing the impact of exogenous shocks, have 
also significantly reduced the persistence of volatility, implying that these 
events are responsible for a significant part of volatility persistence. 
  
 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  This paper set out to examine the extent to which stock markets’ 
reaction to terrorist violence has changed over time. A large (the London 
stock exchange) and a small (the Athens stock exchange) capitalization 
market were used as the vehicles for the empirical investigation. Findings of 
both the event study methodology, as well as the conditional volatility 
models used here, do no seem to point to any clear and unequivocal picture 
or pattern. Both markets appear to react selectively, either in terms of returns 
or in terms of volatility, to terrorist incidents and this reaction does not   22
present any noteworthy change over time. The political significance of the 
target hit, such as for example the attempted assassination of the UK’s Prime 
Minister in the 1984 Brighton Hotel bombing or the 1990 assassination of a 
conservative MP, seem to be the terrorist incidents that mostly rattled the LSE 
and so did successful attacks on hard targets such as courts and military 
buildings. But the effect was generally transitory and it would appear that 
overtime resilience to such incidents has grown judging from the findings in 
the case of the 2005 bombings by muslim extremists. Perhaps, a clearer 
pattern is the case for the ASE and pointing to a similar conclusion when it 
comes to the political significance of the targets hit. Targets with a key 
political importance, such as the assassination of foreign citizens and in 
particular US and European diplomatic and military personnel seem to have 
been the events that mostly affected ASE but interestingly not so when 
Turkish Embassy personnel was the target despite the tense bilateral relations 
between the two countries. The same strong negative reaction was the case 
when a prominent businessperson was the victim but not when a prominent 
politician and serving MP was killed. Again, there is no evidence of any 
significant or noteworthy change in ASE’s reaction over time.  
Therefore, it appears, that a common feature in the results for both 
markets is that the political significance of the targets and/or the victims of 
the terrorist attacks is the factor that triggers the greatest reaction. A further 
finding of the results reported herein worth mentioning is that the smaller of 
the two markets, i.e. ASE, was the one that exhibited a greater reaction,   23
whenever affected, to terrorist events. As other studies have also reported, 
size and maturity appear to emerge as two possible determinants of markets’ 
reaction to terrorist attacks.    24
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